The Year People Doubted their Leaders: 2011 in Review

After the American Century

2011 was the year when people all over the world declared they doubted the legitimacy or the capacities of their leaders. This common theme emerged almost everywhere.

In Japan, after the Tsunami and accompanying nuclear plant disaster, the public rightly distrusted their government and its regulation of the utilities.

In Tunisia, in Egypt, and in Libya, the "Arab Spring" erupted, as dictators were thrown out of power.

In Syria, protests began and still continue calling for the end of a corrupt and nasty regime.

In the late summer and fall, Britain and the United States, protesters occupied public spaces protesting the banking system's irresponsible behavior, enormous unearned bonuses, and subsequent special treatment from their governments.

In the Russian winter,  thousands of people took to the streets to protest a corrupt regime and  a rigged election.

In Europe the EURO wobbled through to 2012, but the angry crowds in Greece, Italy and other parts of Southern Europe were also expressing their anger at incompetent leadership.

The cultures and political systems involved are quite different, and the problems are unique, but common to all of these events is an extensive use of smart phones, blogging, Youtube, and other aspects of the new media environment. We apparently are seeing a new disposition of information and communication, with accompanying disruptions of ill-founded legitimacy. 

At least one theory has been developed to explain these things, Howard Reingold's Smart Mobs (Basic Books, 2002), which has also spawned a webpage. Reingold focuses on what it can mean for millions of people to have access to smart phones. There are also people out there writing about "self organizing groups.) Whatever label we put on it, it seems the power of any centralized state to control the media is breaking down. 

I say "seems" because it is too soon to know the ultimate result. I am sympathetic to the idea that access to the new media increases the flow of information and thereby enhances democracy. But the new media also enhances the flow of dis-information, prejudice, anger, and half-truth. Amplifying people's voices may just create more confusion. (For discussion of this problem, see chapter eight on my Technology Matters,)

But these doubts should not distract us too much. For in 2011, it seems, the "smart mobs" were correct to overthrow Arab dictators, protest sweet deals for bankers who created the financial crisis, demand new elections in Russia, and shame the incompetent in Japan who had built a poorly protected nuclear plant in an exposed location.

The question becomes, what will follow these eruptions of popular protest in 2012? Will the Japanese create a more energy efficient, post-nuclear power system? Will Arab nations create a public sphere where different points of view are tolerated and democracy can flourish, or will they create ideologically conservative, closed societies? Will the occupation movement open up American democracy and help break the gridlock between Republicans and Democrats, or will it further polarize the United States? Will Syrians prove strong enough to overthrow their dictator? Will the Russian protesters be able to make their government more democratic or will its autocracy increase as a response? Will Europeans use the new media to help solve or to worsen the ongoing crisis of the Euro?  The opportunities are many but the dangers are rife.

Afghanistan

After the American Century

Imagine you are in Obama's inner circle. You have inherited Bush's foreign policy, including the two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. What do you do? Pulling out immediately would invite the Taliban and Al Qaeda back into the country, and it would also expose the new president to fierce criticism from the Republicans. No president wants to lose a war in the first year of his administation, and no American politician can survive very long if he seems be doing favors for Osama Bin Ladin. But if the Americans are going to continue to lead an army in Afghanistan, what are the realistic possibilities for success? This was such a difficult issue that the Administration took a year to decide.

The answer has now been made public, and in essence it is to escalate the war for almost two years and then begin to pull the troops out. This resembles in some respects the "solution" to the Iraq situation, which conceivably still could work. The idea seems to be that a nation torn apart by centuries of religious, ethnic, and tribal differences can and will pull itself together if given a timetable for withdrawel, support in developing new democratic institutions, and the promise of control of its own destiny. But will the Iraqi or the Afghan people will take responsibility for their own fate if they know that soon all the foreign troops will leave? The answer is still unclear in Iraq. On the positive side it was long a secular state (albeit a dictatorship) and the presence of vast oil reserves gives it an economic foundation and a good reason not to let civil war paralyze exports. On the negative side, the Kurds want indepdence, the religious factions tend to kill each other, and Iran is not a model neighbor.

Unhappily, things are less promising in Afghanistan, which is a far less developed country than Iraq. Under the Taliban it had one of the world's most repressive, fundamentalist regimes. And it does not have oil. Rather, the proverbial undiscussed elephant in the room, and a rather sweaty demanding elephant at that, is the drug traffic that has been a central part of the Afghan economy for a long time. Afghanistan produces about 90% of the world's opium. Worse, the size of the poppy crop has been growing not shrinking. (For more about that click here)

This is not a new or casual illegal business, nor one that be eradicated easily. Profits from opium sales are a central source of funds for the Taliban and also for semi-autonomous local leaders. Farmers can make more money growing poppies than anything else, and if they do so they also gain protection from powerful neighbors.

However, the Obama speech about Afghanistan did not discuss this aspect of the problem very much. In one passage declared, "To advance security, opportunity, and justice - not just in Kabul , but from the bottom up in the provinces - we need agricultural specialists and educators; engineers and lawyers. That is how we can help the Afghan government serve its people, and develop an economy that isn't dominated by illicit drugs."

This is surely correct. At least in theory something like a special Peace Corps for Afghanistan ought to have been part of the Afghan strategy from the beginning. George Bush failed at the arts of peace in both Iraq and Afghanistan, however, leaving Obama with two very large problems to solve without much capital to do it after saving a collapsing banking system.

But where are these agricultural specialists and educators and engineers going to come from? How can they work effectively in an environment permeated by the opium trade? Who will protect them day to day? Who is going to pay their salaries and guarantee them medical treatment for the rest of their lives if they are maimed or wounded? Unemployment may be high, but it will be hard to recruit people for such dangerous work. Yet it is essential work. If Afghanistan remains focused on producing opium, it will have a large renegade economy that pays no taxes, works against the state, and funds war lords and insurgents.

Democracy in Iran?

After the American Century

I have followed Iranian politics, casually to be sure, for almost half a century. This is for the simple reason that I had an aunt who married an Iranian lawyer and remained in the country after originally going there to teach. She had a Ph.D. in linguistics from the University of Michigan, a somewhat unusual achievement for a woman in c. 1940. There were few university jobs available then (i.e. probably none), and so she took a series of interesting positions working for the US government in agencies that were precursors for the Peace Corps. First she taught in Bolivia and Peru. where she perfected her Spanish. Later she taught English in India briefly, before ending up in Tehran.

My Aunt Gertrude was a powerful personality. Think of the strong women in American cinema from the same era, like Kathrine Hepburn. She was adventurous, eloquent, forceful, and a wonderful role model for a kid growing up. Th exotic aunt who not only had a professional job, but a series of positions in many parts of the world.

She gave most of her professional life to improving the teaching of English in Iran, putting in more than 25 years before the Shah's government fell. By then she was over sixty years old, and because she was perceived to be an old woman, she was left alone by the Revolution. This is not the place for more about her, but she remained in the country for several more years, until it became clear that she would never be allowed to teach or take an active part in the cultural life of the nation again. Then she returned to the US, with her Iranian daughter, who still lives there today. Aunt Gertrude herself lived to be over 90.

Now let me read this little story as a minature version of what has happened to Iran. Until 1979 the nation was modernizing rapidly, using its oil money to develop a middle-class. This middle class embraced foreigners like my Aunt, who had married one of their own, who spoke the language, and who had only the country's betterment at heart. But the growth of this middle-class also brought discontent with a monarchical form of government. The urban middle class wanted a democracy and more western form of government. But the rural people and the poor disliked the Shah for quite a different reason, because he was secularizing the society. Religious fundamentalism swept through the country, and the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini became the idealized leader who would return Iran to its religious roots.

The problem in late 1970s was that not enough people like my Aunt Gertrude had been there, nor had they been there long enough, to nurture the transition to a secular, democratic state. The forces against the Shaw were strong enough to topple him, but there was no unity amongst the university students, peasants, and religious leaders who together brought him down. In the ensuing power struggle, obviously won by the fundamentalists, many of the talented young (like my cousin, Aunt Gertrude's daughter) left the country for ever.

In the election yesterday, the struggle appears once again to be between city and country, between middle class and rural peasants, and between modern Muslims and fundamentalists. The basic inconsistency, the core problem that came to light in the late 1970s, has not yet been resolved. But the terms of struggle have changed someone. For no truly secular figure had a chance in this election. Rather, the two leading candidates were each to the right of where their counterparts might have been thirty years ago. The current President Ahmadinejad is a right-wing demagogue who revels in confrontation with the West. His strongest opponent , Mir Hossein Mousavi, is a former prime minister of the country, and generally defined as a "right-wing reformer." This I translate to mean that his policies are at least informed by economic theory and pragmatic evaluations of consequences. A liberal he is not.

Both men have claimed victory. The government began playing games with the telephone system during the election, controls the media which all too-quickly announced a decisive victory for the incumbent, and has already used police to break up peaceful demonstrations in favor of Mousavi. Ideally this crisis will end well, with a run-off election between the two main candidates, as prescribed by law if no one receives more than half the votes. But it may be too soon for such a disciplined and secular outcome, and Iran could be falling into an intractable crisis.

What was different at the end of the American Century?

The twentieth century, it is generally agreed, was the American Century. This webpage is dedicated to studying where the United States is headed in this new century, which cannot belong to the US to the same degree. It seems appropriate to reflect back over what changed between 1900 and 2000 in this first blog. For the nation changed stupendously in that time.

By 2006, the American population had grown to 300 million, four times that of 1900. The people were no longer concentrated in the Northeast, but had spread more evenly across the country. A rural nation had become urban and then suburban. A nation where only men over 21, and primarily white men, could vote, had expanded the franchise to all its citizens over 18. A nation that had banned African Americans from most public amusements and often denied them the vote had elected many Black men and women to the office of mayor, governor, and US Senator. In 2006 the public considered Barak Obama and Condoleezza Rice suitable for the presidency. A largely white nation had become a hub of multiculturalism.

A nation primarily of farmers and blue-collar workers had become a nation of office workers. A nation lighted mostly by gas and powered almost entirely by steam had electrified. A nation that once relied on horses and railroads had one car for every adult, plus an enormous airline industry. A few small companies making five-minute silent films had grown into the massive film industry. A nation devoted to the live entertainment of vaudeville, theaters, and other public places had largely privatized leisure by embracing the phonograph, radio, television, and Internet. A nation so uncertain about the value of its own literature that many still read British novels and poetry had both rediscovered the great writers of its first centuries and had produced a new pantheon of authors. A nation that once accepted the supremacy of European fine art had pioneered abstractionism and established New York as the world art capital. A nation bent on prohibiting alcohol had not only accepted its consumption but also fostered excellent vineyards and breweries.

There were more problematic developments, however. An isolationist nation with no standing army in peacetime had become the world's only superpower, capable of intervention anywhere. A nation that had identified itself with democracy had at times supported totalitarian regimes abroad. A nation proud of its Bill of Rights had imprisoned men for years on a military base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, without pressing charges against them or allowing them the rights normally granted to prisoners. A nation that had periodically been obsessed with "100% Americanism," the dangers of Catholicism, Fascism, and Bolshevism, found a new enemy, the religiously inspired terrorist. A nation that had prided itself on being the asylum of immigrants from around the world built an expensive wall across parts of the Mexican border, in an unsuccessful attempt to keep out illegal immigrants. A nation that had appeared to be shifting toward secularism in 1900 now seemed to welcome fundamentalism, and religious sectarianism not only flourished but gained increasing political influence.

How important were each of these various elements of the "American Century"? That is what this Blog seeks to understand.

If you want a more detailed retrospective, have a look at The American Century

[coauthored with Thomas Johansen], which is now available from SDU Forlag.