Are Europe and Greek Debt like the Titanic and the Iceberg?

After the American Century

Imagine that Europe is a large ocean liner called the Titanic, and that it is sailing straight toward a massive iceberg that has appeared in the Mediterranean off the coast of Greece. The original idea  for the ship was to create watertight compartments (national economies) below deck, so that if one or more of them filled with water (debt), the others would not also fill up. But this original plan was not fully carried out in the actual construction. The ship turns out not to be unsinkable because its compartments are not sufficiently strong, watertight, or numerous.

If I could go back in time and rebuild the Titanic, I would carry out the original design more completely. Greek debt is the iceberg smashing into the Euro, and I would rather each national economy had largely to stand on its own. Unfortunately, the European "reform" that seems to be favored by most leaders today is to remove most of the interior barriers and thicken the outside hull of the ship as a whole. The idea is that superior leadership and regulation from the center will avoid most of the fiscal icebergs of the future, and that when they do come the improved hull with be strong enough. I would rather not make well-functioning economies hostage to the Italians, the Greeks, the Spanish, and the Portuguese, or for that matter to any country that in the future might get itself into financial trouble.

What can Europe learn from this fiasco? I suggest that it ought to learn to keep the national economies more separate, rather than the widespread idea that what Europe needs is more integration. Better, surely, (1) to prevent banks from loaning more than 4% of their total worth to a single country, and (2) to limit how much money any nation can borrow abroad, making it finance a minimum 75% of its own national debt. If its own citizens will not buy most of the debt, why should anyone else?

More than two years ago I argued that Greece should not be bailed out. I wrote then, "Greece cannot pay its bills, even in the short run. With a national debt that is more than 110% of its gross national product, and a deficit of more than 10% for this year, Greece's debt will only get worse unless and until it enacts real reforms. So far it has failed to do enough, and the deficit will only get worse."

Most of what I wrote then is sadly still accurate now, except that the rest of Europe and the IMF have been pumping money into Greece while insisting on draconian reforms. But it has not worked. The choices then as now are either Greece leaves the common currency and goes back to its traditional overspending (with periodic drachma devaluation) or it really puts its house in order. Sadly, the second task is beyond its political capacity, as its recent, failed election process demonstrates.

As the crisis has been prolonged, money has been fleeing the country for safe havens before the collapse which seems to draw slowly but inexorably closer. It is difficult to know precisely how much money has been transferred or carried personally away from Greece, but it is more than €1 billion. This money could have helped keep the economy going. It is like taking blood from a dying man. Adding further to the misery, tourists are wary of booking trips to Greece, because it may descend into financial and political chaos. Why go there when other places are far more stable?

The only bright spot here is that the rest of Europe has had 27 months to prepare itself, by putting some firewalls in place. Whether these are good enough is not clear.

Had the Greeks been hit with a natural disaster like an earthquake, they would deserve sympathy and charity. But for years the Greek insisted on spending more than they could afford. They gave massive pay increases and early retirement to state employees that were not funded by taxation. Tax evasion was massive. There is no reason for the other European states to give or to loan them any more money. Giving them another handout will only delay for a short time the day of reckoning.

Can the EURO be Saved by Top Down Budget Controls that Start Next October? And Is Brussels Really Up to this Job?

The New EU Agreement May Not Work in Practice

After the American Century 

I confess that the Euro Crisis seems to me only temporarily "solved." Except for Britain, all the other countries seem ready to let the EU have a veto over their budgets.  Is this idea feasible or practical? I think it will prove unworkable, at the latest by November, 2013. I very much hope events prove me wrong, but I fear this was an ill-advised treaty based on panic diplomacy.

Assume this new agreement goes into force and try to imagine how it will work. Each autumn all 17 nations using the Euro (and some 8 or 9 nations who might someday use it)  will send their national budget to Brussels and then sit back and wait for weeks or more likely months to hear whether their budget is acceptable.

Brussels will need to have deep knowledge of each nation's domestic politics and economy, so deep that each budget can be evaluated fairly, and quickly. If a single committee of experts examines each of the 25 national budgets and gives just one day to each, it will require five weeks to review them all. That is too superficial a look and yet would take to long, so there would need to be teams of Eurocrats devoted to different clusters of nations. And what chance is there that different committees will all apply the rules in the same ways?

These 25 or 26 national budgets will be complex documents built upon political compromises and assumptions about how each national economy will do in the following year.  This year it took the Danes well over a month to come up with their budget, which began with horse-trading behind closed doors between members of the newly elected coalition. What if the technocrats in Brussels declare such a budget invalid? Who then decides where the cuts should be made? How long will decision making take? How will coalitions respond if Brussels imposes cuts that hurt one party in the coalition far more than others? Might not Brussels cause governing coalitions to collapse, forcing new elections, and leaving nations without budgets in the meantime?

Which economic theory will be used to provide the standard model?  And what system of national accounting will be used? All nations will need to use the same or very similar systems, one would think, otherwise it will be hard to apply the same rules in an evenhanded manner. Most nations will have to "translate" their customary budget into an EU-friendly form.

What will be the allowable margin of error - i.e. the allowable difference between annual projection and actual performance in the previous year? Will a nation that suffered a natural disaster, such as a flood or earthquake be fined for failing to meet expected performance targets?  What if the cuts favor banks rather than homeowners, or they hurt schools rather than hospitals? Workers rather than pensioners? Suppose an EU budget decision is controversial? Can it be appealed? Meanwhile, is a nation making an appeal unable to tax and spend until a decision is final? These are only some of the questions that come to mind. I cannot imagine such a scheme working in the real world. 

If we assume that the new arrangement is approved this spring, expect a bureaucratic circus in October and November, 2012.

I think the new treaty is a bad idea because
(1) it is a top-down control mechanism that will be unworkable.

(2) It is based on the idea of cutbacks everywhere as the solution, and does nothing to create jobs or foster growth, except growth in the Brussels bureaucracy.

(3) It does not focus on the international banks as a major part of the currency problem. The banks irresponsibly loaned billions of Euros to nations that could not repay their debts, and the new idea is to let the European Central Bank make those loans instead. I would rather see much tighter controls on the banks themselves, learning from the effective regulation of the Canadian banks who rode out the 2008 crisis quite well.

The Scandinavian countries, none of whom now have the Euro. should put a few people to work on Plan B: a common currency for Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. This would quickly be recognized as solid and secure. Compared to working with Brussels, it would be easy to administer. This particular Plan B has been discussed before and rejected. Would any Danish political party have the courage to explore this idea? Probably not now.

Wait until about 2013, when people see the complexities, inequities, and delays that come with a centralized Euro and top-down control of national budgets. By then, Britain may look like the smart one who opted out early.

A Greek Crisis Should NOT be A Euro Crisis

After the American Century

When my neighbor down the street goes on a spending spree, no one thinks all the neighbors should chip in and pay for his extravagance. The neighbor has to learn to live within his means. The same applies to nations. Greece has for years been living far beyond its means. It has allowed people to go on pensions at an earlier age than they can in other nations. It has not collected taxes from some of its citizens. It has allowed its public sector to grow and grow. It has routinely had much larger deficits than are allowed in the European Union.

Now the bill is coming due, and suddenly the world's stock markets see this as a crisis of the Euro. It is not. There is no reason for Germans to work a year longer before retirement so that Greeks can retire early. There is no reason why British home owners should pay higher interest rates because the Greeks have not lived within their means. There is no logic to the idea that the Euro will be stronger if other countries pay Greece's bills. Rather, it is logical that the Euro will be stronger if its nations enforce fiscal responsibility and prudence.

It sounds harsh but it is only fair that, if the Greeks cannot pay their bills, they must find their own solution to the problem. Greece is not a poor nation. It has many wealthy people. It has not suffered an earthquake or some other unforeseeable natural disaster. Greeks saw the problem for years and failed to deal with it. Greeks have to take responsibility for their own fate, rather than expect the International Monetary Fund or the other EU counties to pay their bills. Loans to Greece are fine, but only if they are going to be paid back.

People seem to think it terrible to contemplate Greece defaulting on their national debt. Yes, it is terrible, but it is even more terrible if other countries pay their bills. The Germans are quite right to resist loaning the Greek government money before they demonstrate that they can bring their economy into balance. The banks should have been equally hard on Greece years ago. International investors have over-extended credit to profligate nations, and they want others to pick up the tab. Sorry, but that is not how things are supposed to work.

Ah, but we are told, the poor Greeks will suffer under the austerity of budget cuts. Indeed, they will. That is the logical consequence of fiscal irresponsibility.  The Greeks as a whole are not poor,  and if they really want to they can invest their considerable wealth in government bonds, and then, as voters, make sure they get their money back. The Greek pension funds could be heavily invested in the Greek national bonds.  Or the Greek's could hold a massive telethon and get their own citizens to buy ten year government bonds at 5%. That would inject some reality into the situation. If Greeks don't want to buy their own debt, then why should anyone else?

Beware of Greeks demanding gifts. Beware of investment banks wringing their hands and saying the Euro is at risk, when it is their  poor judgement that led them to keep loaning money to Greece. And stop this nonsense of thinking that if Greece goes bankrupt due to a lack of political integrity and national will, somehow that means that the Euro itself is weak or that Germany or France or Sweden suddenly are not good places to do business. It should be just the opposite situation. The reluctance to pay the Greek bills should signal that the EU nations as a whole are sensible, that they will not be stampeded by incautious bankers into paying someone else's bills.

If all this seems a rather harsh argument, consider that other common market, the United States. The 50 individual states each has its own budget, and some of them at times get into trouble. California has overspent and under taxed itself into a corner at the moment. But that is California's problem, and it does not mean that the dollar is suddenly a bad currency.

California's economy is larger than that of Greece. Time to get some perspective on this issue.